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1. Introduction
At least since Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), it has been widely held that information is
almost completely non-appropriable and costless to acquire.2 As emphasised in those papers, the
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1 Tel.: +353 1 716 8551; fax: +353 1 283 0068.
2 “… no amount of legal protection canmake a thoroughly appropriable commodity of something so intangible as information.
The very use of the information in any productive way is bound to reveal it, at least in part.” (Arrow (1962), p. 615.).
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One possible resolution to this dilemma was highlighted by Spence (1984), who pointed to
research joint ventures as a way of internalising the positive externality which one firm's R&D
confers on its rivals. Work by Katz (1986), d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Leahy and
Neary (1997) among others cautioned that research joint ventures also have a negative impact on
welfare, which dominates for low R&D spillovers. Research joint ventures serve in effect as a
partial surrogate for product-market collusion, so lowering output and welfare below the social
optimum. Nevertheless, it is widely held that R&D spillovers are sufficiently high that the net
effect of research joint ventures is positive, especially when information sharing within research
joint ventures leads to full technology transfer between the members of the research consortium.
In practice, competition authorities in both the EU and the U.S. tend to tolerate if not actively
encourage research joint ventures.
Yet even if information cannot be appropriated, it need not be a free good to other firms. As
emphasised by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), acquiring the results of R&D requires effort by the
recipient firm. Rather than thinking of R&D spillovers as exogenous, they argued that a firm
needs to invest in its “absorptive capacity” if it is to realize R&D spillovers from other firms.3
Cohen and Levinthal themselves also presented some empirical evidence in favour of the
absorptive capacity hypothesis using observations on business units, and subsequent work has
produced considerably more. The importance of absorptive capacity has been confirmed using
observations on a panel of industries across thirteen OECD countries by Griffith, Redding and
Van Reenen (2004), and on individual firms by Girma (2005). Cockburn and Henderson (1998)
have shown it to be crucial in a case study of the pharmaceutical industry, while Blomström and
Kokko (1998) find that spillovers from foreign-owned firms are greatest when the technological
gap between them and local firms is least, and interpret this as consistent with the absorptive
capacity hypothesis. Perhaps most persuasively, Wakelin (1998) used one data set to classify
exporting firms as either innovators or non-innovators, and then showed that the exports of
innovators were less sensitive to costs and more sensitive to R&D spillovers, as measured by a
different data set.
Partly stimulated by this accumulation of empirical evidence in favour of the absorptive
capacity hypothesis, increasing attention has been devoted to its theoretical implications, and in
particular its implications for the efficacy of research joint ventures. Kamien and Zang (2000) and
Grunfeld (2003) consider this issue assuming that investment both reduces costs directly and
contributes to absorptive capacity. Martin (2002) covers similar ground in a tournament model of
R&D, where the winner of the innovation race licenses the new technology to the loser. Kamien
and Zang (2000), Molto et al. (2005) and Weithaus (2005) explore the implications of assuming
that firms initially choose the “direction” of their R&D efforts, and that the difference between the
directions chosen by two firms affects their ability to absorb spillovers. However, all these papers
have used special functional forms and have concentrated on the case of Cournot duopoly. In this
paper we consider the desirability of research joint ventures in a model which admits general
forms for both the demand and absorptive capacity functions, and encompasses both Cournot and
Bertrand competition with many firms. We also explore the implications of the absorptive
capacity hypothesis for the view that research joint ventures are always desirable when3 An older literature in development economics used the term “absorptive capacity” in a macroeconomic context to
refer to the idea that higher rates of investment lower the productivity of new investment. See Eckaus (1987) for a review
and Keller (1996) for an extension. Cohen and Levinthal appear to have been the first to apply the concept of absorptive
capacity in the microeconomic context to individual firms.
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Throughout, we concentrate on the “two faces of R&D” case, assuming that, in addition to its
direct effect on costs, a firm's own R&D enhances its capacity to absorb the benefits of rivals'
R&D. We also confine attention to the case of incremental process R&D, since this seems most
appropriate to the industries in which absorptive capacity has been found to be important, from
automobiles to microelectronics to pharmaceuticals.4
In Section 2 we specify a general model of the absorptive capacity process and explore its
implications for the incentives to engage in R&D and for the effective level of spillovers. We
also show how our model relates to some special cases which have been considered by Cohen
and Levinthal (1989), Kamien and Zang (2000), Martin (2002) and Grunfeld (2003). Section 3
turns from the firm to the market to consider how absorptive capacity alters R&D incentives
and welfare with and without cooperation by firms. Section 4 extends this analysis to the case
where there is complete information sharing between firms. As already noted, the literature
to date has suggested that research joint ventures are unambiguously welfare improving in
this case. Finally, Section 5 considers how, when building absorptive capacity is important,
knowledge from outside the industry affects the strategic interactions between R&D-intensive
firms.
2. Absorptive capacity
We follow the usual treatment of R&D spillovers in assuming that a typical firm's marginal
cost depends negatively on both its own and its rivals' R&D. The novel feature is that the level of
usable rival R&D may be less than the actual level of R&D carried out by other firms in the
industry. Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), the ratio of usable to actual rival R&D is the
firm's absorptive capacity and it depends on its own level of investment in R&D. To formalise
these ideas, write the typical firm's marginal production cost c as a negative function of own and
usable rival R&D, denoted by x and y respectively:5
c ¼ cðx; yÞ ð1Þ
Own R&D x reduces marginal cost in a standard fashion, with its effectiveness measured by the
partial derivative of c with respect to x, which we denote θ:
hu cxðx; yÞ N 0 ð2Þ
Similarly, usable rival R&D y gives rise to spillovers, whose extent is measured by the ratio of the
partial derivatives of c with respect to y and x, assumed to lie between zero and one:
bucyðx; yÞ=cxðx; yÞ z 0; 0VbV1: ð3Þ
Note that β and θ are not necessarily constant.
So far, this specification is standard. Now, let X denote the actual level of R&D carried out by
other firms in the industry. The ratio of usable to actual rival R&D, y/X, is the firm's absorptive4 See Kim (1998), Lim (2000), and Cockburn and Henderson (1998) respectively.
5 To avoid over-burdening the paper with additional notation, we assume that other firms are symmetric, so usable rival
R&D y can be treated as a scalar. The analysis can easily be extended to the general case, but this yields no additional
insights.
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facilitate comparative statics, we assume it depends on an exogenous parameter δ, which
represents the “difficulty” of absorbing rival R&D:6
y ¼ yðx;X ; dÞ ð4Þ
We normalise δ to lie between zero and one, corresponding to the extreme cases of full (y=X) and
zero absorptive capacity (y=0) respectively.
To flesh out the concept of absorptive capacity, we must place some restrictions on Eq. (4).
Trivially, we assume that usable rival R&D cannot exceed actual rival R&D, so that absorptive
capacity lies between zero and one: y≤X, with a strict inequality when δ is positive. Next, we
make two mild assumptions about the marginal responsiveness of y to x and X:
Assumption 1. yx≥0, with a strict inequality if and only if 0bδb1 and XN0.
Assumption 2. 0≤yX≤1; when δ=0, yX=1; when δ=1, yX=0; and, when 0bδb1, yXb1.
These assumptions imply that both x and X increase usable rival R&D at the margin, except in
the extreme cases of zero and full absorptive capacity.
To see the implications of this approach, combine Eqs. (1) and (4) into a single reduced-form
marginal cost function:
c˜ðx;X ; dÞuc½x; yðx;X ; dÞ ð5Þ
Now we can define two new coefficients:
ðaÞ h˜u c˜x ¼ ð1þ byxÞh ðbÞ b˜u c˜Xc˜x ¼
byX
1þ byx ð6Þ
Here θ˜ measures the full impact of own R&D on unit costs. Eq. (6)a shows that this cannot be
less than the direct impact, θ, and will typically bemore than it. Expenditure on R&D has an added
pay-off because it allows the firm to avail of spillovers from rivals' R&D. As for β˜ , it measures the
effective spillover coefficient, which gives the ratio of the marginal returns to rival and own R&D.
The key implication of Eq. (6)b is that β˜ cannot be more than the direct spillover coefficient β and
will typically be less than it. Because rival R&D is costly to absorb, its attractiveness relative to
own R&D is reduced. To sum up:
Proposition 1. Given Assumptions 1 and 2: (i) θ˜ ≥θ, with a strict inequality for βyxN0; and (ii)
β˜ ≤β, with a strict inequality for either yXb1 or yxN0.
Thus the dependence of absorptive capacity on own R&D raises the effectiveness of own
R&D but lowers effective spillovers.6 This difficulty has many different dimensions. On the one hand is the complexity of the R&D, which influences the
ease with which it can be absorbed. On the other hand are the capabilities of the firm, which, for a given level of research
effort x, influence its ability to reverse engineer and otherwise benefit from the research efforts of other firms. Finally,
there is also the “direction” of R&D, which matters for absorptive capacity to the extent that it differs from the directions
chosen by other firms. As noted in the introduction the latter interpretation has been endogenized by Kamien and Zang
(2000), Molto et al. (2005) and Weithaus (2005).
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interpret δ as a measure of the difficulty of absorbing rival knowledge:
Assumption 3. yδb0.
Naturally, usable rival R&D, and so absorptive capacity y/X itself, falls as the difficulty of
absorbing rival R&D increases.
Assumption 4. yXδ≤0.
This implies that usable rival R&D is decreasing in δ at the margin.
Assumption 5. d(yX/yx)/dδ≤0.
This implies that the marginal rate of substitution between own and rival R&D in producing y
is decreasing in δ. Finally:
Assumption 6. dβ/dy≥0.
This implies that the direct spillover coefficient is not decreasing in usable rival R&D.7 Since,
from Assumption 3, y is decreasing in δ, Assumption 6 also implies that an increase in the
difficulty of absorbing rival R&D does not raise the direct spillover coefficient.
We can now state how the key coefficients β˜ and θ˜ are affected by changes in δ:
Proposition 2. Given Assumptions 1–6: (i) θ˜ −θ is increasing in δ at δ=0 and decreasing in δ at
δ=1; and (ii) β˜ is decreasing in δ. All these derivatives are strict when β is strictly positive.
The proof is in Appendix A. Proposition 2 states that greater difficulty of absorbing rival R&D
reduces the effective spillover coefficient β˜ , but has an ambiguous effect on the effectiveness of
own R&D, paradoxically raising it if the level of difficulty is initially low.8 Intuitively, part (i) of
the result arises because own R&D “has only one face”, i.e., cannot raise usable rival R&D, if
absorption is either effortless or impossible (i.e., δ equals either zero or one respectively). At
intermediate values of δ, R&D is more effective because it raises absorptive capacity. Hence the
effectiveness of R&D is increasing in δ when absorption is effortless but decreasing in it when
absorption is impossible.
Proposition 2 has an insightful corollary. Consider an industry composed of n symmetric
firms, each with technology given by (1) and (4). Suppose that all firms increase their R&D by a
small amount. Let θ˜μO denote the resulting fall in the unit cost of production of each firm, where
μO equals the marginal social return to R&D per unit output, normalised by the marginal private
return to R&D θ˜ . This must equal:
AOu
c˜x þðn 1Þ c˜X
c˜x
¼ 1þ ðn 1Þ b˜ : ð7Þ7 Differentiating Eq. (3), dβ/dy = (cxcyy−cycxy) /cx2. Hence, Assumption 6 is equivalent to assuming that cxcyy−cycxy is
non-negative.
8 Both θ˜−θ and β˜ depend on the levels of R&D, as well as on δ, in general. To find conditions under which they are
independent of x, assume that the absorptive capacity function y is homogeneous of degree ν in {x,X}. Then, with X=(n−1)x
in symmetric equilibria, it can be shown that dln(θ˜−θ) /dlnx=ν−1+dln(βθ) /dlnx and (θ˜ /θ)dlnβ˜/dlnx=ν−1+dlnβ/dlnx.
Hence θ˜ −θ (respectively β˜) is independent of x if and only if (i) y is linearly homogeneous in {x,X}, and (ii) βθ
(respectively β) is independent of x. These restrictions are satisfied by the Kamien–Zang specification, Eq. (9) below, but
not by the Cohen–Levinthal one Eq. (8) (for which ν=1+ xγx/γN1).
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Corollary 1. An increase in the difficulty of absorbing rival R&D reduces the marginal social
return to R&D relative to the marginal private return.
This shows that, the more important is the need to invest in absorptive capacity, the smaller is
the externality associated with R&D.
The general specification of absorptive capacity given in Eq. (5) encompasses some special cases
which have been considered in the literature. Two in particular areworth noting. The first, due toCohen
and Levinthal (1989), assumes that average and marginal absorptive capacity (y/X and yX) are equal:
c ¼ cðxþ byÞ; cVb0; where : y ¼ Xgðx; dÞ ð8Þ
where β is a constant and γ is increasing in x and decreasing in δ. An unsatisfactory feature of this
specification is that absorptive capacity y/X depends only on own R&D and is independent of the
extent of rival R&D, X. A further problem is that Cohen and Levinthal assume that the marginal
responsiveness of usable rival R&D to own R&D is increasing in δ: γxδN0, implying that yxδN0. This
guarantees that Assumption 5 is satisfied but it also implies that dθ˜ /dδ is always positive. The latter is
plausible for low δ but, as Proposition 2 (i) shows, is inconsistent with our assumptions as δ approaches
one.9
The second special case, due to Kamien and Zang (2000), assumes that marginal cost depends
linearly on own and usable rival R&D, and that usable rival R&D in turn is a Cobb–Douglas
function of own and actual rival R&D:
c ¼ c0  hðxþ byÞ where : y ¼ ð1 dÞxdX 1d ð9Þ
where θ, β and δ are constants.10 This specification satisfies Assumptions 1–6 for most
reasonable parameter configurations.11 Fig. 1 illustrates the implied values of θ˜ and β˜ as
functions of the primitive parameters β and δ in a symmetric two-firm case (with θ set equal to
unity). The effect of δ in first raising and then lowering θ˜ is evident from panel (i); while panel
(ii) shows that the effective spillover coefficient β˜ falls off very rapidly as δ increases.
3. Research joint ventures and absorptive capacity
So far, we have considered only the firm-level implications of the need to invest in absorptive
capacity. We now want to consider its implications for industry performance. A central issue in9 Martin (2002) uses a variant of Eq. (8) which avoids this difficulty. In our notation, his specification is γ(x,δ)=−xlnδ/
(1−xlnδ). This implies that γxδ=− (1+xlnδ)/(1−xlnδ)3, which approaches zero as δ approaches zero, is positive for low
values of δ, and falls to −1 when δ equals one. Grunfeld (2003) uses a different variant, with βγ equal to (β+ sx) / (1+sx)
and s interpreted as a “learning” parameter. A potential problem with this specification is that it is not always possible to
distinguish between spillovers and absorptive capacity. A value of β equal to one is sufficient to render the absorptive
capacity motive redundant: rival R&D is then freely absorbed.
10 This functional form was introduced in an earlier unpublished version of Kamien and Zang (2000). In their published
paper the right-hand side of Eq. (9) is multiplied by an additional term (1−δ⁎) where δ⁎ is the “direction” of the rival
firm's R&D, and both δ and δ⁎ are chosen by their respective firms.
11 Assumptions 1, 2, 5 and 6 are always satisfied. In extreme cases, Eq. (9) may violate the restriction that absorptive capacity
cannot exceed unity (y≤X), and the assumptions that usable rival R&D is decreasing in δ on average (Assumption 3) and at
the margin (Assumption 4). Violations are at risk when the firm spends considerably more on R&D than all its rivals put together
(so x/X is much greater than one) and δ is relatively low. Direct calculation shows that: y/X=(1−δ)(x/X)δ and dlny/dδ=ln(x/X)−
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ventures. To explore the implications of absorptive capacity for this issue, we build on Leahy and
Neary (1997), which extends the model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to many firms and
a general specification of functional form and market structure.
We consider a two-period model of symmetric oligopoly, in which n firms first invest in cost-
reducing R&D and then engage in either output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand) competition. R&D
takes time to affect costs, and R&D spending cannot be concealed from rivals. Hence, it is natural to
confine attention to two-stage sub-game perfect Nash equilibria, with decisions on R&D in period 1
anticipating subsequent decisions in period 2. In period 2, each firm chooses the level of an action ai,
which corresponds to either output in Cournot competition or price in Bertrand competition.
The typical firm's profits equal sales revenue R less variable costs cq less fixed costs Γ:
pi ¼ Rðai;AiÞ  c˜ðxi;Xi; dÞqðai;AiÞ  CðxiÞ: ð10Þ
Here xi and X− i denote the levels of R&D by firm i and by all other firms respectively; similarly
ai and A− i denote the period-2 action chosen by firm i and the vector of actions by all other firms,
respectively. Production costs depend on the level of output q, which we write as a function of
own and rivals' actions. In Cournot competition, q(ai,A− i) equals ai, while in Bertrand
competition it equals the demand facing firm i, which depends on own and rivals' prices. As for
the cost terms, marginal cost c˜ is given by Eq. (5) and fixed costs Γ depend only on own R&D.
We first solve for the non-cooperative equilibrium. Once R&D levels are determined, the
representative firm maximises profits by setting to zero the partial derivative of Eq. (10) with
respect to its action ai. This in turn implies that higher levels of R&D are associated with higher






Here we use x and q without subscripts to denote the values of R&D and output in symmetric
equilibria; qi denotes ∂q(ai,A− i)/∂ai; qa denotes dq/da in symmetric equilibria; and both qi and qa
are positive (equal to one) in Cournot competition and negative in Bertrand competition. Recall
from Section 2 that μO is the marginal social return to R&D per unit output, normalised by the
private return θ˜ . In symmetric equilibria, this equals both the effect on one firm's marginal cost of
a unit increase in R&D spending by all firms, and the effect on the marginal costs of all firms of a
unit increase in R&D spending by a single firm.
Consider next the choice of R&D levels. Without cooperation, each firm chooses its R&D to













¼ AN h˜q CV¼ 0; ð12Þ
As in all two-stage oligopoly games (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984), the firm takes account of
both the direct or “non-strategic” effect of its R&D, given by ∂πi/∂xi, and also of the “strategic”
effect which works by affecting the rival firms' outputs in period 2. This implies equating the12 See Lemma A1 in the Appendix for more details. The first-order condition is πi=Ri− c˜ qi=0, where πi denotes ∂π i /∂ai.
Totally differentiating and imposing symmetry, so that daj=dai and dX−i=(n−1)dxi, gives Eq. (11). The denominator
Δ equals − [πii+(n−1)πij] and must be positive from stability of the period-2 sub-game.
1097D. Leahy, J.P. Neary / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 25 (2007) 1089–1108marginal cost of R&D, Γ′, to the marginal return, where the normalised marginal return per unit
output (with a superscript “N” for “non-cooperation”) is given by:13
ANu1þ ðn 1Þaðb¯  b˜Þ; where: a N 0 and b¯ u pij
pii
: ð13Þ
This shows that with spillovers lower than the threshold level β¯ , the firm “over-invests” in
R&D, relative to the non-strategic bench-mark marginal return of θ˜ ; while with spillovers higher
than β¯ , the fear of providing costless benefits to rivals leads to under-investment. (Note that β¯ is
positive if and only if period-2 actions are strategic substitutes (i.e., πijb0).) Since, from
Proposition 2, greater difficulty of absorbing rival R&D reduces β˜ , it follows that, other things
equal, it raises the marginal return to R&D when firms do not cooperate.
The situation is very different if the firms form an industry-wide research joint venture. To
model this, we follow d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and assume that firms choose their
R&D levels cooperatively to maximise joint profits (denoted by Π), while period-2 actions
continue to be chosen non-cooperatively. This seems to match the regulatory environment in both
Europe and the U.S., in which R&D joint ventures are permitted by anti-trust authorities. (Until
the next section, we assume that a research joint venture does not directly raise the spillover









þ ðn 1Þ daj
dxi
 
¼ AC h˜q CV¼ 0; ð14Þ
where the normalised marginal return to R&D per unit output (with a superscript “C ” for
“cooperation”) is now:14
ACu /AO; / b 1: ð15Þ
Higher spillovers raise the impact of one firm's R&D on industry profits and so tend to
encourage investment when firms cooperate. (Though even with high spillovers, μC is less than
μO: the incentive to engage in R&D is lower than its marginal social return.) Hence, other things
equal, greater difficulty of absorbing rival R&D lowers the marginal return to R&D in
cooperative equilibria, since it lowers the effective spillover coefficient β˜ .
Whether cooperation leads to more R&D than non-cooperation depends on the magnitude of
the effective spillover coefficient, β˜ . Combining (13) and (15), evaluated at the same levels of
R&D and actions:
AC  AN ¼ aV b˜ b¯ V
 
; aVuðn 1Þðaþ /Þ N 0 and b¯ Vu a
aþ / N 0 ð16Þ14 To derive Eq. (15), note first that ∂Π/∂xi is just μOθ˜q−Γ′, the net marginal social return to R&D. The next term in
Eq. (14), ∂Π/∂a, gives the effect on industry profits of a change in any firm's action in a symmetric equilibrium. It equals
πi+(n−1)πji, which reduces to (n−1)πji. Finally, the term in parentheses in Eq. (14) is equal, in symmetric equilibria, to
da/dx, which is just μOθ˜qi/Δ from Eq. (11). Hence, ϕ equals 1− (n−1)h, which is less than one. We assume that the
second-order conditions hold in symmetric equilibrium: see Leahy and Neary (2005) for further discussion.
13 The notation is similar to that in Leahy and Neary (1997). The term α equals hπii/(πii−πij), where h in turn equals
−πjiqi/qΔ. The term πji denotes ∂πi/∂aj and is negative in Cournot competition and positive in Bertrand competition. Since
Δ is positive as already noted in Footnote 11, h must be positive. The second derivative πii in the numerator of α is
negative from the firm's second-order condition for output. We make the natural assumption that πiibπij. This ensures
that α is always positive, and that the threshold spillover parameter, β¯ , is always less than one.
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coefficient exceeds a new threshold value β¯′. Eq. (16) implies that the difference between μC and μN
depends on δ only through β˜ .15 Hence we can again make use of Proposition 2:
Corollary 2. An increase in the difficulty of absorbing rival R&D reduces the marginal private
return to R&D cooperation relative to non-cooperation.
Under mild regularity and stability conditions (see Leahy and Neary (1997), Proposition 3, and
conditions (1) and (2) in Proposition 3 below), this ranking of the incentives to engage in R&D
translates into an equivalent ranking of output and R&D levels in symmetric equilibria.
Finally, we need to consider the effect of an increase in δ on the relative levels of welfare in the
two regimes. Consider first the special case where the demand and marginal cost functions are
linear, the non-cooperative equilibrium is stable in the sense of Seade (1980), and the absorptive
capacity function satisfies the restrictions in Footnote 8. In this benchmark case, it is
straightforward to show that an increase in δ reduces the welfare advantage of R&D cooperation.
When the benchmark assumptions (other than stability) are relaxed, the result continues to hold
provided we retain some mild regularity conditions. (We also assume in the remainder of this
section that the spillover term β can be treated as a parameter.) We first state a lemma which gives
conditions for the cooperative level of R&D to behave in the expected way as a function of β and δ:
Lemma 1. The cooperative level of R&D is increasing in β and decreasing in δ, provided μa
C/qa
and θ˜ β are not too negative and θ˜ δ is not too positive.
The proof is in Appendix B, where it is noted that the condition on μa
C/qa is equivalent to ruling
out “too much” convexity of the demand function. As for the restrictions on θ˜ β and θ˜ δ, inspection
of (6)a shows that these amount to assuming that the direct effects of β and δ on θ˜ outweigh the
indirect effects.
We can now state a full set of sufficient conditions which guarantee that higher difficulty of
absorbing rival R&D reduces the welfare gain from R&D cooperation:
Proposition 3. Assume the following: (1) The second-best welfare function is quasi-concave in
R&D; (2) the Seade (1980) stability condition holds at the non-cooperative R&D equilibrium; (3)
the conditions of Lemma 1 apply; and (4) the product (μa
C−μaN)qi and the derivative β˜ x are not
too negative. Then the threshold value of β, above which welfare with cooperation in R&D
exceeds welfare without cooperation, is increasing in δ.
The proof is in Appendix B. The assumptions require that the equilibrium is minimally well-
behaved, that the demand function does not exhibit “too much” convexity, and that the direct effects
of their arguments on θ˜ and β˜ outweigh the indirect effects. This result implies that cooperation is
less likely to yield welfare benefits as the difficulty of absorbing rival R&D increases: conversely, a
reduction in absorptive capacity undermines the welfare case for encouraging research joint
ventures.
The implications of this result can be seen more clearly by concentrating on a special case. This
combines the functional form for marginal production costs already given in Eq. (9) with Cournot15 Inspecting the expressions forα′ and β¯ ′, it can be seen that they depend only on the levels of actions and on the derivatives of
the profit function with respect to actions. The latter derivatives include terms in c˜ , which in turn depends on δ. However, these
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1100 D. Leahy, J.P. Neary / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 25 (2007) 1089–1108behaviour, a linear demand function and a quadratic cost of R&D function.16 Fig. 2 shows how
welfare without and with R&D cooperation vary with β and δ. Panel (i) shows that welfare
without cooperation reflects the asymmetric effect of higher difficulty on θ˜ , the full effectiveness
of R&D, which we noted in Fig. 1; while both panels (i) and (ii) show that the benefits of higher
values of β are quickly eroded as difficulty increases. Panel (iii) compares cooperation and non-
cooperation directly, the region above AB showing the size of the parameter space in which
cooperation fails to raise welfare. The result of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin applies when δ is
zero: cooperation leads to higher welfare when the spillover parameter β exceeds 0.5. However,
as δ rises, this advantage is rapidly eroded.
4. Information sharing and effective spillovers
So far we have assumed that a decision by firms to engage in a research joint venture does not
in itself affect the spillover coefficient β. However, as emphasised by Kamien et al. (1992), Motta
(1996), Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) and others, cooperation is likely to involve information
sharing and so an increase in β. This increases the presumption that research joint ventures will
increase welfare. Nevertheless, making information freely available does not guarantee that it can
be freely absorbed: an increase in β does not imply a fall in δ (the difficulty of absorbing rival
R&D) and may have limited benefits if δ is high. In this section we consider how the need to
invest in absorptive capacity qualifies the benefits of information sharing.
To emphasise the contrast, we assume that a research joint venture leads to full information
sharing (so β is unity) whereas non-cooperation implies no information sharing (so β is less
than one). (For convenience we assume in this section that β is parametric.) Writing WI(δ) for
the level of welfare attained with full information sharing, and WC(β,δ) for the level of welfare
attained with cooperation in the absence of information sharing, we have by definition that:
W 1ðdÞ ¼ WCð1; dÞ ð17Þ
We can be sure that full information sharing does not lower welfare. Formally:
Lemma 2. Full information sharing cannot reduce the level of welfare when firms cooperate on
R&D:
WI ðdÞzWCðb; dÞ; 8b ð18Þ
The proof is immediate.17
We now wish to show that, even with full information sharing, cooperation in R&D may lead
to lower welfare than non-cooperation. A sufficient condition for this outcome is that, in the
absence of spillovers, non-cooperation leads to higher welfare than cooperation:
WN ð0; dÞ N WCð0; dÞ; 8d ð19Þ17 From Eq. (33) in Appendix B,WC(β,δ)=WS[xC(β,δ),β,δ], whereWS is the second-best welfare function, conditional on
oligopolistic behaviour in the second stage. To show that this is increasing in β, note that ∂WS/∂x is positive for reasons
given in Appendix B (following Eq. (34)); dxC/dβ is positive from Lemma 1; and ∂WS/∂β is positive by inspection.
16 The demand and R&D cost functions are p(q+Q)=a−b(q+Q) and Γ(x)=½χx2. The diagrams are drawn for the case
of n=2 and η=0.4, where η≡θ2/bχ is a measure of the relative effectiveness of R&D. In addition, a−c0 and b are
normalised to equal unity. A Gauss program to draw the diagrams for arbitrary values of n and η is available at: http://
www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/peter.neary/papers/absorptv.htm.
Fig. 3. Welfare with and without information sharing.
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externalities to internalise, so the only role of cooperation is to act as a partial surrogate for
product-market collusion. It therefore leads to unambiguously lower levels of R&D and output,
which presumptively lowers welfare. The condition is satisfied by all the specific functional
forms used in the literature. (Compare for example panels (i) and (ii) in Fig. 2 at β=0.) It could
conceivably be violated in cases where, in the absence of spillovers, non-cooperation leads to
socially excessive levels of R&D, and cooperation offsets this. However, such cases must be
considered unlikely.18 Ruling them out leads to the next result:
Proposition 4. Given Eq. (19), then, for every value of the spillover coefficient β in the unit interval,
there exists a threshold value of the difficulty of absorption coefficient δ, δˆ (β), with 1N δˆ (β)≥0, such
that non-cooperation leads to higher welfare than cooperation with full information sharing, for all
δ greater than δˆ (β).
Proof. Since Eq. (19) holds for all values of δ, it holds when δ equals one. But when δ equals
one, effective spillovers are zero and so both WC and WN are independent of β. Hence:
WN ðb; 1Þ NWCð1; 1Þ ¼ WI ð1Þ; 8b ð20Þ
where the last equality follows from Eq. (17). This proves that, for every value of β, non-
cooperation leads to higher welfare than full information sharing when δ takes its maximum
value. Proposition 4 follows provided welfare in each regime is continuous in δ. □18 “Socially” is crucial here. Absent spillovers, investment in R&D is greater without cooperation than with cooperation
in many models, such as Cournot competition with linear demands or models of patent races. However, this does not
imply that investment is socially excessive; on the contrary, cooperation in the absence of spillovers, by reducing
investment and output, is likely to lower welfare. (On patent races see Reinganum (1989, p. 850).) Martin (2002) finds
that cooperation raises welfare in a two-firm model of an R&D race even if input spillovers are zero; however, he
assumes that both firms use the post-innovation technology, so in effect output spillovers are high.
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used earlier. As in panel (iii) of Fig. 2, non-cooperation leads to higher welfare than cooperation
without information sharing at all points above the AB locus. With full information sharing, the
advantages of cooperation are naturally greater. However, if absorbing rival R&D is sufficiently
difficult, then even cooperation with full information sharing is dominated by non-cooperation.
This occurs for points in the region above DB. In this region, high difficulty reduces the effective
spillover coefficient β˜ to such an extent that even full information sharing does not justify
cooperation.
5. Extra-industry knowledge
A further implication of the absorptive capacity perspective is that firms must engage in R&D
before they can reap the benefits of knowledge from outside the industry. This can be formalised
by augmenting Eq. (1) as follows:
c ¼ cðx; y; kÞ where: k ¼ kðx;KÞ ð21Þ
and y is determined by Eq. (4) as before. Own investment is needed to transform actual extra-
industry knowledge K into usable extra-industry knowledge k. Crucially, K is exogenously
given, independent of the actions of firms in the industry, whereas k depends positively on both x
and K, and in turn reduces marginal cost c.
An obvious implication of this specification is that the welfare levels in all the equilibria
considered in the paper are increased if there is an exogenous increase in actual extra-industry
knowledge K. A more subtle implication is the effect of higher K on the strategic incentives to
invest in R&D. As in Section 2, we can combine the components in Eq. (21) into a single reduced-
form marginal cost function:
c˜ðx;X ;KÞ ¼ c½x; yðx;X Þ; kðx;KÞ ð22Þ
In this augmented framework, the effectiveness of own R&D and the effective spillover
coefficient from rival firms' R&D become, instead of Eq. (6), the following:
ðaÞ h˜ u c˜x ¼ ð1þ byx þ jkxÞh ðbÞ b˜u c˜ xc˜ x ¼
byX
1þ byx þ jkx ð23Þ
where κ equals ck/cx, the effectiveness of extra-industry knowledge relative to own R&D. Eq.
(23) implies that the effectiveness of R&D is now further increased, and the effective spillover
coefficient β˜ is now further reduced, relative to their direct counterparts, θ and β. Proposition 1
can therefore be strengthened. With both κ and kx strictly positive, θ˜ is strictly greater than θ, and
β˜ is strictly less than β, even if yx is zero and yX is one.
Finally, we can show that more outside knowledge reduces the extent of effective spillovers.
As in Section 2, we need some mild restrictions:
Assumption 7. dβ/dk≤0.
Assumption 8. d(β/κ) / dk≤0.
In words, an increase in usable extra-industry knowledge does not raise the inter-firm spillover
coefficient, either absolutely or relative to the extra-industry spillover coefficient κ.
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This implies that an increase in own R&D does not reduce kK, which can be interpreted as the
marginal rate of absorption of extra-industry R&D.
We can now state:
Proposition 5. Given Assumptions 7–9, β˜ is decreasing in K.
(The proof is in Appendix C.) Increasing external knowledge has an extra strategic effect,
diluting the disincentive to refrain from investment which will benefit competitors. The policy
message is clear (though, of course, the direct costs of increasing Kwould have to be included in a
complete cost-benefit calculation).19 Measures to raise the general level of research expertise in
the economy are presumably desirable in themselves for a variety of reasons, not least because,
unlike direct subsidies to R&D, they avoid the need for governments to pick winners and are less
prone to capture. Our results show that they have the additional advantage of diluting the strategic
disincentive to engage in research with unappropriable spillovers.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have peeped inside the black box of R&D spillovers. A growing body of
empirical evidence strongly supports the view that R&D increases a firm's “absorptive capacity”
(its ability to absorb spillovers from other firms) as well as contributing directly to profitability. To
explore the theoretical and policy implications of this insight, we first specified a general model of
the absorptive capacity process which encompasses a number of special cases considered in
previous work. We showed in this framework that costly absorption both raises the effectiveness
of a firm's own R&D and lowers the effective spillovers which it obtains from rival firms.
We then turned to consider the implications of the absorptive capacity perspective for the stance
of public policy towards R&D. It is well-known that spillovers dilute the strategic incentive for
competing firms to engage in R&D. It is also well-known that cooperation between firms has the
effect of internalising the strategic externality between them, which, at least for high spillovers,
leads to higher R&D and welfare. By contrast, we show in this paper that, when firms have an
incentive to engage in R&D to build up absorptive capacity, the non-cooperative incentives to
carry out R&D are enhanced, and so the ability of R&D cooperation to raise welfare is reduced.
Surprisingly, this effect operates even when R&D cooperation leads to full information sharing
between firms. These results weaken the case for encouraging research joint ventures.20
The final contribution of this paper is to examine the possibility that a firm's own R&D may
help it to absorb knowledge from outside the industry as well as from rival firms. We show that
the need to engage in R&D to absorb external knowledge further reduces the effective spillover
coefficient between rival firms. This means that an increase in external knowledge has an extra
strategic effect, over and above its obvious direct effect. This in turn implies an additional
strategic pay-off to policies that raise the general level of research in the economy.
Of course, inside the black box of spillovers, we find more black boxes. Our model simplifies
by assuming that R&D spending is homogeneous, whereas many applications of the absorptive19 For a discussion of the issues surrounding publicly-funded R&D, as well as a review of the econometric evidence for
its effects on private R&D, see David and Hall (2000).
20 They also weaken the case for subsidising R&D in open economies. See Leahy and Neary (1999).
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research (“D”). (See, for example, Cassiman, Pérez-Castrillo and Veugelers (2002), and see
Hammerschmidt (2006) for a theoretical model which distinguishes between investment in R&D
and investment in absorptive capacity.) Provided there is some substitutability between different
kinds of R&D, the qualitative results of our paper still go through. Our parameterisation of extra-
industry knowledge in Section 5 invites further refinement, though it may be the first attempt to
formalise the notion of a firm's “connectedness” to external knowledge, the importance of which
is suggested by case studies of the pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries by Cockburn
and Henderson (1998) and Lim (2000) respectively. Finally, our theoretical framework takes no
account of the spatial dimension of R&D spillovers. Even within countries, Audretsch and
Feldman (1996) have shown that spillovers tend to be very localised, so firms have an incentive
to locate close to their rivals in order to reduce their need to invest in absorptive capacity. On a
larger scale, Branstetter (2001) has shown that spillovers are more important intra- than
internationally. This effect gives multinational firms an incentive to perform their R&D more
centrally than their production in order to minimise technology transfer to rivals. Further work is
needed to explore the implications of the absorptive capacity perspective for all these issues.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
To prove part (i), differentiate θ˜ from Eq. (6):
d h˜
dd
¼ ðcxy þ cyyyxÞyd  cyyxd ð24Þ
The first term in this expression, −cxyyδ, is the derivative of the direct effectiveness coefficient
with respect to δ, dθ/dδ. We therefore need to sign the remainder of the expression, d(θ˜ −θ)/dδ, at
the end-points δ=0 and δ=1. From Assumption 1, yx is zero at δ=0 and δ=1, and strictly
positive for 0bδb1. Hence it follows that yxδ and therefore d(θ˜ −θ)/dδ itself, must be positive at
δ=0 and negative at δ=1. (For example, this is true in the simplest case of the Kamien–Zang
specification, Eq. (9), with two symmetric firms, so x=X: cyy=0, and yxδ=1−2δ).
To prove part (ii), differentiate β˜ from Eq. (6):
d b˜
dd




The three terms inside the square brackets are non-positive from Assumptions 3 plus 6, 4 and 5
respectively. The first term is zero when β is fixed independent of y, and the third term is zero
when y is separable in {x,X} and δ. □
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 3
Since the proposition deals only with comparisons between symmetric equilibria, we define a
new cost function c¯ as a function of symmetric x as follows:
c¯ðx; b; dÞ ¼ c½xþ by x; ðn 1Þx; df g ð26Þ
The derivatives of this are:
c¯x ¼ AO h˜ b0; c¯b ¼ hyb0; c¯d ¼ bhydN0; ð27Þ
making use of Eqs. (6) and (2) and Assumption 3.
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shifted in the expected direction by changes in β and δ:
Lemma A1. Irrespective of the mode of competition, equilibrium output is increasing in R&D
and β, and is decreasing in δ.
Proof. The period-2 first-order condition for a typical firm can be written as a function of
symmetric x and a and of β and δ:
piðx; a; b; dÞ ¼ 0: ð28Þ
where the subscript “i” denotes a derivative with respect to an individual ai. Differentiate and
rearrange:
ðpiaÞda ¼ pixdxþ pibdbþ piddd ð29Þ
where the subscript “a” denotes a derivative with respect to symmetric a. The coefficient of da
(which equals Δ from Footnote 11) is positive from the stability condition for the period-2 game.
The term πix equals θ˜qiμ
O and is always positive under Cournot and negative under Bertrand
competition. The other two terms can be signed from Eq. (27): πiβ=−qic¯β is positive under
Cournot and negative under Bertrand competition; while πiδ=−qic¯ δ is negative under Cournot
and positive under Bertrand competition. Finally, these ambiguous effects on equilibrium actions
imply unambiguous effects on equilibrium outputs given that qa≡dq/da is positive under
Cournot competition and negative under Bertrand competition, as stated in the text. □
The next step is to sign the comparative statics of R&D in the cooperative equilibrium as stated
in Lemma 1 in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1. The first-order condition for R&D of a typical firm under cooperation, Eq.
(14), can be written in terms of industry profits as a function of symmetric x and a and of β and δ:
Piðx; a; b; dÞ ¼ 0 ð30Þ
where the subscript “i” here denotes the derivative with respect to xi. Differentiating totally and
using Eq. (29) to eliminate da gives:
½Pix Piap1ia pixdxC ¼ ½Pib Piap1ia pibdbþ ½Pid Piap1ia piddd ð31Þ
On the left-hand side, the coefficient of dxC is positive from the second-order condition for
maximisation of industry profits by choice of R&D. Turning to the right-hand side, the term
Πia=qa(μ
C+qμa
C /qa)θ˜ is positive under Cournot competition and negative under Bertrand
competition, provided μa
C/qa is not too negative. This term is zero if demands are linear, while
under homogeneous-product Cournot competition it has the same sign as r′, the marginal
curvature of demand (where p(nq) is the inverse demand function and r≡nqp″/p′). The term Πiβ
in the coefficient of dβ equals q(μβ
Cθ˜ +μCθ˜ β), which is positive provided θ˜ β is not too negative.
Combined with the terms already signed in Lemma A1, this implies that dxC/dβ is positive.
Finally, the term Πiδ in the coefficient of dδ is q(μδ
Cθ˜ +μCθ˜ δ), which is negative provided θ˜ δ is
not too positive. This implies that dxC/dδ is negative. □
The final step is to compare the levels of welfare with and without cooperation. In symmetric
equilibria the welfare function can be written as W=W(x,a,β,δ). As in Suzumura (1992), we can
use Lemma A1 to eliminate a to obtain the second-best welfare function, WS:
WSðx; b; dÞuW ½x; aðx; b; dÞ; b; d ð32Þ
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The actual R&D levels under cooperation and non-cooperation depend on the spillover and
difficulty parameters. Using xN(β,δ) and xC(β,δ) in Eq. (32) gives:
Whðb; dÞ ¼ WS ½xhðb; dÞ; b; d; h ¼ N ;C: ð33Þ
Let WD(β,δ)=WC(β,δ)−WN(β,δ) denote the difference between the cooperative and the non-
cooperative levels of welfare at given values of β and δ. Similarly, we define μD(x,a,β,δ) as μC(x,
a,β,δ)−μN(x,a,β,δ), etc. After these preliminaries we can proceed to the proof of Proposition 3:
Proof of Proposition 3. The strategy of the proof is to show thatWβ
DN0 andWδ
Db0 at allWD=0.
Since dβ/dδ conditional onWD=0 equals −WδD/WβD, this suffices to prove the proposition. Consider
first the total differential ofWD(β,δ)=0.We assume that the R&D levels under cooperation and non-
cooperation are identical when the welfare levels are equal:WD=0 implies that xD=0. (We rule out
pathological cases in which WD=0 but xC≠xN.) Hence:




S is positive given the quasi-concavity of the second-best welfare function WS in R&D and
the fact that the cooperative level of R&D is below the second-best optimal level. Therefore it
must be the case that Wβ
D has the same sign as xβ
D and that Wδ
D has the same sign as xδ
D. All we
then have to show is that xβ
D is positive and xβ
D is negative.
The cooperative and non-cooperative R&D levels satisfy first-order conditions of the form:
μh(xh,ah,β,δ)θ˜ (xh,β,δ)qh(ah)=Γ′(xh), where h=C,N. Since they also satisfy the first-order
condition for actions in Eq. (28), we can use Lemma A1 to eliminate ah. The cooperative and
non-cooperative first-order conditions for R&D can then be written in compact form as:
mhðxh; b; dÞ ¼ CVðxhÞ; h ¼ C;N ð35Þ
where the left-hand side is: mh(xh,β,δ)≡μh[xh,a(xh,β,δ),β,δ]θ˜ (xh,β,δ)qh[a(xh,β,δ)]. Totally
differentiate Eq. (35) with respect to β:
ðmhx  CWÞxhb þ mhb ¼ 0; h ¼ C;N : ð36Þ





ðmDx xCb þ mDb Þ ð37Þ
To determine the sign of the right-hand side of (37), first note that the denominator mx
N−Γʺ is
negative from the Seade (1980) stability condition for the non-cooperative R&D equilibrium. The
sign of the right-hand side therefore depends on the sign of the expression in square brackets. We
consider the individual terms in this expression in turn.
The derivative xβ
C is positive from Lemma 1. Since mx
C and mx
N are evaluated at the same point,
we can write:
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Dqi.
Assumption 4 of the Proposition requires that these two terms are not sufficiently negative that β˜
in Eq. (37) becomes negative. This is guaranteed in many plausible special cases. (For example,
from Footnote 7, β˜ x is strictly positive for the Cohen–Levinthal specification and zero for the
Kamien–Zang specification of the absorptive capacity function. As for μa
Dqi, with linear
demands, whether in Cournot or Bertrand competition, it is zero. In homogeneous-product
Cournot competition it has the same sign as the marginal curvature of demand, r′.) Finally, since
mCβ and m
N
β are evaluated at the same point, we can write:




h˜ q where: ADb ¼ aVb˜b N 0 ð39Þ
Once again, this expression, and hence Eq. (37) as a whole, is positive provided μa
Dqi is not too
negative. Substituting Eq. (37) into Eq. (34) completes the proof that Wβ
D is positive. A similar
chain of reasoning can be used to show that Wδ
D is negative. This completes the proof that the
threshold value of β is monotonically increasing in δ. □
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 5
Differentiating β from Eq. (23):
db˜
dk
¼ ½ðcxcyk  cycxkÞkK þ ðckcyk  cyckkÞkxkK  cyckkxK  yX
c˜ 2x
ð40Þ
The three terms inside the square brackets are non-positive, from Assumptions 8, 7 and 9
respectively. The first and second terms are zero respectively when β and κ/β are fixed and
independent of K.
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